The manner in which Al Gaeda recruits is much less overt as compared to office recruitment. It uses social bonds based on the propaganda which contributes to mujahedin recruitment. A biography of 400 Islamic terrorists showed that around 70% of terrorists were not recruited in their native countries. Most of them had travelled overseas in search of better life through job or education. Due to family alienation and family separation, they become venerable to terrorist groups especially at Mosque places. Factors like friendship, kinship, and discipleship, accounted for 68%, 20% and 10 respectively. The Salafist terrorist groups use social networking, (Blake, 2011).
Individuals serve as links that are critical among prospective recruits and groups of Mujahidin, on top of autonomous groups. This hub of human links money, equipments, expertise and passes information. The numerous training camps located in Pakistan and Afghanistan provides meeting point for Mujahedin recruits from allover the world, as well as a pool of Al Gaeda recruits for recruit selection. The recruitment qualifications for Al Gaeda seem to be much qualitative in nature, other than being quantitative. Al Gaeda may also hire or recruit experts, as well as the operatives for missions that are in their line, (Blake, 2011). Most of these operatives are reported to originate from the militant jihad groups from Pakistan. In addition, the Al Gaeda group has the capability of reaching the whole world. This can be achieved through its contacts that are fostered in Afghanistan.
Financing of operatives by Al Qaeda
Their operations need funding, for instance, it has been estimated that, in the 11/9, the Al Gaeda spent between $400,000 to $500,000, while the Bali bombing was estimated at $ 74,000, the organization up keep costs $30 million [per annum. Between $ 10 million to 20 million of these much, is paid to Taliban for save sanctuary Around 90% of the Al Gaeda expenses stem from the costs of infrastructure, like protection, communications, networks and facilities used for training.
Most Al Gaeda revenues originate from through Charitable donations, businesses, as well as other illegal activities like drug, weapon and immigrant trafficking. Other originates from forgery, kidnapping, counterfeiting amongst others. The UN report shows that, Saud charities alone, sends $800millions every year. Though Bin Laden enjoys good social access to wealthy individuals allover the world, Arabic countries' funds suffice. Venues for Al Gaeda to get revenues are still intact, (Blake, 2011). The collaborative relation with wealthy Zakat sponsors, banks dealing with laundering of money, business people, as well as charity fronts provided between 300 million to $500 millions to Al Gaeda for the period 1991 to 2001.
Having the Zakat system in place, the present people or institutional brokers, who distribute contributions that are religious, based to either charities or individuals, are the same people who channel money directly to Al Gaeda charities. Such like institutions are much trusted traditionally, and there are no chances that they will change unless are caught and implicated for supporting terrorism willingly. Other than being supported directly by brokers who feel sympathetic within charities that are legitimate having poor financial oversight, Al Gaeda also have loyalists that are implanted within organizations to siphon off cash on the behalf of Al Gaeda. The Al Gaeda's front charities are still under operation though under a different guise. The cash transfer is still untraceable, as the couriers that are broadly used are unregulated hawala system of money transfer.
Al Gaeda has diversified its financial assets into some commodities. It is said to have transferred much of its money to diamonds, gemstones and gold. Engaging in some risky activities like robbery and kidnapping is thhe last resort for the group, (Blake, 2011).
Fight Against Terrorism to Track and "Follow the Money
Getting to know how finances are obtained, laundered and transferred, is the best way of retaining control of the organizations' wealth and knows its direct use. The problem has been that, terrorism money has been much difficult to get, much less seize. This has been based on the reason that, terror activities are carried out on modest budgets. For them to sustain bigger group confederations, around the world, terror groups need large sums of money for the provision of sanctuary, transport, security, as well as leverage with other groups. If the source and transfer of terrors money is followed and channels identified, such like channels will be cut off, most of their activities will turn un-operational. The recruitment of new members will not take place, there will be no houses and foods for the operatives, training camps will be closed down, there will be no purchase of weapons and equipments, money used for identity document forging will not be available, communications will stop, and lastly there will be no bribery and intelligence gathering. In other words all the organizations operations will not be viable. As an effect, the group will seize from terror activities, (Kevin, 2005).
It is because of the present resiliency of salafist ideologies of Jihad, and the absence of political freedom and economic chances in Muslim states, there are many recruits willing to join terror groups with the aim of harming the United States and its close allies. The matching intents together with ways, on the other hand, remain to relay on linkages to a group with the capability of executing operations that in most cases become successful, because of good leadership, means and resources. The best way of dealing with like a group is through fighting against terrorism by tracking and following their money.